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Abstract: This article attempts to explore and analyse the evidence for cohabiting the human
security concept into the national security frameworks of ASEAN countries. Using the Philippines
and Malaysia as case studies, the article determines the extent to which public officials and
policymakers have redefined and reenvisioned national security by incorporating non-traditional,
people-centered elements of human security. The word 'cohabitation' refers to national govern-
ments' efforts to amalgamate statist and humanist dimensions of security when articulating and
implementing  their  national  security  rhetoric  and  agenda.  It  argues  that  human  security
naturally complements state security, and vice versa. As such, human security and state security
co-exist in a constructive manner that enhances the overall level of national security. In other
words, they are mutually constitutive rather than mutually corrosive. Both cases underscore a
two-pronged assumption. First, the meaning and provision of national security can neither be
eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated without considerations for 'below the state'
actors and issues. And second, the eminent status vis-à-vis power of the state in providing
national security can neither be trivialized nor undermined.
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1. Introduction
Twenty  years  after  the  official  debut  of  human
security in academic and policymaking circles in 1994,
the  concept  continues  to  be  a  source  of  important
debates directed at the progressive re-imagination of
national  security.  In  Southeast  Asia,  however,  the
concept has had very limited influence in the govern-
ments' formulation  and  implementation  of  their
respective national security rhetoric and agenda [1–3].
This  is  largely  due to the conflicting  views on what
should be considered as a threat  between the state
and various non-state actors within these societies. At
the heart of this conflict between statist and humanist
advocates  of  national  security  is  the  shared  belief
among Southeast Asian leaders in the ASEAN Way [1–3].
© 2014 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published 
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For the region's top officials, the ASEAN Way is deemed
the most appropriate style of diplomacy as it underlines
the value of traditional notions of sovereignty and non-
interference  in  conducting  interstate  relations  [4].
While the Western method of diplomacy is driven by
binding agreements through the adoption of legalistic
procedures  and  formalistic  solutions,  the  ASEAN
approach  operates  through  non-binding,  invisible
ground rules of informality,  inclusivity  and consensus
[4].  Different  labels  have  been  used  by  various
observers  to  describe  the  ASEAN  Way  such  as
'organizational  minimalism',  'soft  regionalism',  'soft
dialogue',  and  'thin  institutionalism' ([4]  pp.  14–27).
Such  a  preference  for  'sports  shirt  diplomacy' over
'business  shirt  diplomacy' has  naturally  limited  the
practical  application  of  human  security  in  rethinking
national security in the Southeast Asia ([4] pp. 14–27).
Against  this  backdrop,  this  article attempts  to
explore the evidence for the  'cohabitation' of human
security  concept  within  the  national  security  frame-
work of ASEAN countries in the twenty-first century. It
specifically  examines  the  Philippines  and  Malaysia's
experiences with cohabiting state-centric and people-
centered  dimensions  of  national  security.  The  word
cohabitation  in  this  context  refers  to  the  national
government's  attempt  at  amalgamating  statist  and
humanist elements of security when articulating and
executing its national security policies. The goal is to
determine  the  extent  to  which  policymakers  have
defined  national  security  based  on the  cohabitation
between  state-centric  and  people-centered  dimen-
sions of national security. Cohabitative security, there-
fore,  refers to the approach being employed by the
Philippine  and  Malaysian  governments  in  cohabiting
human  security  into  their  national  security  frame-
works.
The  article argues  that  human  security  naturally
complements state security, and vice versa. As such,
human  security  and  state  security  co-exist  in  a
constructive manner that enhances the overall level of
national security. On the one hand, state security does
not automatically negate human security nor compete
with individuals and communities; on the other, human
security does not necessarily threaten state security nor
compete against state actors and agencies. The reason
for this is that human security and state security are
mutually  constitutive  rather  than  mutually  corrosive.
This  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  context  of  the
increasing,  albeit  gradual,  recognition  among  ASEAN
governments that  human security  is  an essential  di-
mension  and  necessary  precondition  for  national
stability and security. Such a scenario implies that the
divisive dichotomy between these two security dimen-
sions  is  hardly  insurmountable.  Ironically,  it  is  the
insecurity  felt  by  individuals  and  states,  rather  than
security  that  is  transforming  ASEAN's  traditional
normative terrain into a region cognisant of the value
of  cohabiting  humanist  and  statist  components  of
national security.
Moreover,  by  examining  governments' efforts
toward cohabitative  security,  the  article argues  that
the  inherent  bias  against  states  can  be  mitigated,
enabling  mutual  trust  to  develop  between  the  arti-
ficially divided state and non-state agents of national
security. It highlights the areas where states, even if
only to some extent, have practically contributed to
the advancement of the human security agenda. This
is  not  to  defend  or  legitimize  the  shortcomings  of
states with respect to human security, but rather, to
reopen  the  channel  through  which  productive  dia-
logues  between  governments  and  citizens  can  take
place.  The  notion  of  cohabitative  security  does  not
provide a panacea to long-standing conceptual prob-
lems  of  national  security.  Nevertheless,  it  offers  an
alternative tool for reassessing governments' successes
and failures in terms of incorporating individuals and
societies in their respective national security discourses.
In advancing these arguments, the article examines
the  Philippines  and  Malaysia's  experiences  with
cohabitative  security  and  attempts  to  answer  the
following questions. First, who or what is the primary
referent  object  in  the  Philippines  and  Malaysia's
twenty-first  century  national  rhetoric  and  agenda?
Second, what are the main issues that threaten these
primary security referent objects? And third, how do
the Philippine and Malaysian governments, both past
and present, address these threats? Have they been
successful? Why or why not?
The article is divided into four sections. Section two
examines the current composition of the Philippines'
national  security  framework  by  identifying  its  main
components  and  analyzing  the  most  critical  issues
that  threaten  its  primary  security  referent  object—
development  space.  It  argues  that  against  the
backdrop  of  structural  poverty  and  institutionalized
inequality generated by a deeply-entrenched oligarchic
system, the main referent object of Philippine national
security  is  its  diminishing  development  space.
Development space refers specifically to the capacity of
the  Philippine  government  to  independently  and
effectively pursue its economic development goals and
objectives  against  these  constraints.  It  analyses  the
limits  to  the  Philippines' development-based  national
security  framework,  which  in  turn,  undermine  the
effectiveness  of  the  country's  cohabitative  national
security, namely: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii)
limits to Human Security Act (HSA).
Section  three  examines  the  present  condition  of
Malaysia's national security framework by identifying
its main components and analyzing the most critical
issues  that  threaten  its  primary  security  referent
object—diversity  space.  It  argues  that  against  the
backdrop  of  a  Bumiputra-centric  political  economy,
developed and controlled by the UMNO-driven Barisan
Nasional,  the main referent object  of  Malaysian na-
tional security is its shrinking diversity space. Diversity
space specifically  refers  to the capacity  of  all  ethnic
groups in Malaysia to participate freely in the country's
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political and economic affairs against these constraints.
It  analyses  the  limits  to  Malaysia's  diversity-based
national security framework, which in turn, undermine
the effectiveness of the country's cohabitative national
security,  namely:  (i)  limits  to  ideational  security
apparatuses;  and  (ii)  limits  to  material  security
apparatuses.  The  Philippines  and  Malaysia's  primary
security  referent  objects—development  space  and
diversity space—represent the non-traditional, people-
centred  dimension  of  security  as  opposed  to  its
traditional, state-centric dimension.
Finally,  section  four  summarizes  the  main  argu-
ments  presented  based  on  the  analysis  of  two
empirical case studies. It concludes that despite the
limitations  of  the  Philippine  and  Malaysian  govern-
ments in fully  cohabiting the concept of human se-
curity  into  their  respective  national  security  frame-
works, nonetheless, both countries have illustrated a
concrete way of giving entitlement to non-traditional,
people-centered  elements  of  security  as  legitimate
referent  objects  of  national  security.  Both  cases
underscore  a  two-pronged  hypothesis:  (i)  that  the
meaning and provision of national security can neither
be eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated
without considerations for 'below the state' actors and
issues; and (ii)that the eminent status of the state in
terms  of  power  in  providing  national  security  can
neither  be  trivialized  nor  undermined.  Therefore,
rather than downplaying a state-centric concept while
highlighting a people-centred model, cohabitative se-
curity  amalgamates  statist  and  humanist  views  of
national  security.  This  is  one  way  of  resolving  the
'entitled state/untitled human' dilemma in which the
state  is  typically  depicted  as  an  antagonistic  force
impeding the pursuit of human security.
2. Cohabiting Human Security into the 
Philippine's National Security Framework
2.1. The Philippines' 'Cohabitative' National Security
The  Philippines' 2011‒2016  National  Security  Policy
(hereafter, NSP) is a statement of principles designed
for the strategic pursuit  of the country's national in-
terest defined in terms sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity on the one hand, and people's well-being and insti-
tutions on the other [5]. Its primary objectives focus on
balancing  between  'guns  and  butter,' through  more
efficient  allocation of  the  country's  limited resources
and  effective  prioritization  of  internal  and  external
defense. It lays down a fairly comprehensive agenda
which  incorporates  nonmilitary  issues  and  threats
encroaching upon the boundaries of the state. In the
words of President Benigno Aquino III: 'our quest must
not only focus on ensuring the stability of the State and
the security of our nation...our ultimate goal must be
the safety and well-being of our people' ([5] p. 1).
This  holistic  approach to national  security  under-
scores the need to rethink traditional security which
made paramount the military protection of the state
from  external  threats  while  disregarding  issues
generating human insecurities. It is part and parcel of
the larger security sector transformation (SST) which
represents a paradigm shift in security governance by
acknowledging  the  blurring  between  internal  and
external threats  [6].  The main thrust  of  the NSP is
anchored  in  Aquino  III's  'social  contract' with  the
Filipinos,  emphasizing  commitments  to  transfor-
mational  leadership  through  empowerment  of  the
people  and  opportunities  to  enable  the  people  to
escape from the shackles of poverty ([5] p. 6). Aside
from  its  customary  role  in  fortifying  the  country's
juridical  borders,  the  NSP also aims to  cultivate an
environment conducive to human development, that
is, a development-based NSP agenda. Thus, it brings
together  under  one  cohesive  policy  agenda  a  wide
range of security issues, and balances these with its
national peace and development perspectives.
The country's desire to serving as a committed and
trustworthy member of the international community is,
to  a large extent,  driven by the emergence of non-
traditional  security  threats  transcending  national
borders  such  as  organized transnational  crimes,  ter-
rorism and weapons of mass destruction,  pandemics
and  infectious  diseases,  environmental  degradation,
and climate change to name a few [5]. In relation to
this,  the  country  also  acknowledges  the  significant
impact of globalization on its internal affairs. The NSP
document, therefore, promotes the objective of forging
strong  political  alliances  with  developed countries  to
further solidify its political presence in the international
arena, and secure its economic and defense require-
ments  [5].  The  government  believes  that  through
diplomatic engagements, nations will cooperate rather
than compete with each other [5].
In response to this changing security environment,
the  government  has  developed  a  national  security
model comprised of seven core elements that amplify
national  interests,  including:  socio-political  stability,
territorial  integrity,  economic  solidarity,  ecological
balance,  cultural  cohesiveness,  moral-spiritual  con-
sensus,  and  peace  and  harmony  ([5]  p.  3).  These
elements also take into consideration certain psycho-
social aspects of national security including the people's
customs and beliefs, as well as social characters and
norms  influencing  perception  of  government-initiated
policies  and  programmes  ([5]  p.  3).  Hence,  the
government is  very optimistic about the potential of
its twenty-first century NSP agenda for achieving not
only  national  peace  and  security,  but,  more  impor-
tantly, development and prosperity. Working under a
widely  popular  campaign  slogan  of  Daang  Matuwid
(the high road), Aquino III's NSP strongly emphasizes
the  country's  diminishing  development  space,  artic-
ulating  the  issue  as  a  national  security  threat  that
must be effectively secured ([5] p. 31):
"If the government is able to make good on the
promise of taking the high road, the 'Ang Daang
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Matuwid', then it must be sure that the people
are  afforded every  opportunity  to  pursue their
individual dreams of a better quality of life—all
under  the  consideration  of  national  security
where the welfare and well-being of the people
are of primordial consideration."
From the government's perspective, addressing the
country's  long-standing  problems  of  exacerbated
poverty, widening inequality, and other socio-political
maladies  engendered  by  limited  development  space
demands  complementary  policies  such  as  robust
public-private  partnerships  (PPP)  on  the  one  hand,
and  breaking  patronage politics  influencing  decision
making in government's programs and projects on the
other [5]. 
Despite  its  development-based  NSP  agenda,  the
government still  recognizes the importance of main-
taining  a  credible  external  defense  posture  since
globalization has not led to complete obsolescence of
war as an alternative tool for settling disputes when
diplomacy  fails.  Impaired  by  its  present  economic
status,  however,  the  country  is  struggling to  assert
and defend its  position in international  society.  The
government  usually  finds  itself  on  the  losing  end
when settling disputes with advanced countries, given
its  small  player  status  in  the  global  arena,  both
politically  and  economically.  The  debate  between
'guns and butter' has to be settled in favour of 'butter'
given  the  country's  scarce  resources.  After  all,  as
Aquino III has neatly put it,  'For Filipinos to feel this
renewed  sense  of  transformational  leadership,  they
must  also  see and feel  that  the  Government  is  for
them, with them and serving them' ([5] p. 31).
2.2.  Limits  to  the  Philippines'  Development-based
National Security
Clearly, the Philippine government recognizes economic
underdevelopment  as  a  critical  threat  to  national
security.  The  important  question  that  needs  to  be
examined,  however,  is  whether  it  is  genuinely  con-
cerned about addressing the country's economic plight
or is only paying lip service to the electorally-popular
idea of people-centered national security. Despite the
government's  grand  pronouncements  about  pursing
equitable economic development to enhance national
security,  however,  its  security  blueprint  faces  two
limitations  that  put  enormous  challenge  to  such
intention: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii) limits to
human security act. The following subsections discuss
these  limits,  which  help  explain  the  country's  con-
tinuously  shrinking  diversity  space,  and  subsequent
failure  to fully  embed  the  notion  of  human security
(defined in terms of economic security) into its national
security framework.
2.2.1. Limits to Democratization
Based  on  historical  analysis  of  politico-economic
developments in the Philippines, the decision of the
American colonial regime to transplant its own brand
of  representative  democracy  over  an  economic  ar-
rangement  ruled  by  landed  oligarchs  enabled  the
latter to seize authoritative control over what should
have been  'democratic' policymaking procedures and
institutions [7].  Oligarchs in  this  context  are  'actors
who command and control massive concentrations of
material resources that can be deployed to defend or
enhance  their  personal  wealth  and  exclusive  social
position' ([8] p. 6). Accordingly, an oligarch's ultimate
goal  'is  to  secure,  maintain,  and  retain  his  or  her
position  of  extreme  wealth  and  power  against  all
manner  of  threats' ([8]  p.  6).  In  Aristotle's  formu-
lation, democracy is defined as the rule by the poor
majority, whereas oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy
few  [8].  However,  democracy  and  oligarchy  'can
coexist indefinitely as long as the unpropertied lower
classes  do  not  use  their  expanded  political  partic-
ipation  to  encroach  upon  the  material  power  and
prerogatives of the wealthiest' ([8] p. 11).  In other
words, the two systems are compatible for as long as
the  two  realms  of  power  do  not  clash.  So  while
oligarchy  'rests  on  the  concentration  of  material
power',  democracy  'rests  on  the  dispersion  of  non-
material power' ([8] p. 11).
In the case of the Philippines, US officials left aside
policies  that  could  have  transformed  its  political
system into a more level playing field. The country's
domestic political space was insulated from revisionist
agendas espoused by various social factions springing
from a  broad  base  of  political  capital  [7].  In  stark
contrast  to  the  Philippine  experience,  the  Japanese
consciously  shut  down the elite's  access to political
power when they took  over  Korea,  creating  a  very
different political climate for the latter state [9]. The
Philippines' government's  capacity  for  independent
action, therefore, is effectively curtailed by oligarchic
groups attempting to amass public power to preserve
vested  interests  [10‒12].  Further,  the  'redemoc-
ratization' process that  took place immediately after
the  collapse  of  Ferdinand  Marcos' dictatorship  only
resulted in the reinstallation of the pre-Marcos political
order.  This  led to  the  re-emergence of  elite  ascen-
dancy over domestic economy—the sine qua non for
Philippine  economic  underdevelopment  ([7]  p.  49).
Despite the introduction of  various democratic insti-
tutional  reforms,  oligarchic  forces  are  still  able  to
manipulate  and  saturate  the  bureaucracy,  impairing
Philippine polity. 
The  question  therefore  is,  why  and  how  does
oligarchic power overcome state power? Throughout
Philippine  history,  several  influential  families  owning
huge corporations and vast lands have ruled over the
bureaucracy, exploiting the country's public goods and
resources  that  continue to fuel  institutionalized cor-
ruption. Several infamous terms such as  'anarchy of
families',  'booty capitalism', and  'cacique democracy'
([7] p. 50) have been used to describe the country's
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pitiful  politico-economic  construct.  The  conspicuous
incapacity of the government to 'immunize' itself from
oligarch  manipulation  has  been  at  the  crux  of
economic  underdevelopment  [13‒15].  This  unique
political  climate enables the  'top 5.5 % landowning
clans to own 44% of arable land and as few as 100
families  control  all  electoral  positions  on  a  national
level' ([16] p. 13). It is a side-effect of the strategy
employed  by  the  US  regime  to  consolidate  power
throughout the archipelago that the landed elite were
allowed to further  expand their  economic power by
means political appointments [7].
When put together, Filipinos' distinctive concepts of
family and land give rise to the so-called 'patron-client
relationships' which can be used to explain Philippine
political  economy  [17‒18].  The  patronage  system
which  emphasizes  the  Filipino  culture  of  'giving  for
gratitude' and 'labour for loyalty' explains the existence
of an omnipotent elite dominating the country's econ-
omy  cum  politics  [19].  In  this  scenario,  both  the
peasants' and  the  labourers' interests  feed  into  the
landlords' preferences through material and/or personal
transactions via colloquial networks [20]. 
Hence,  when  the  US  colonial  regime  decided  to
establish political offices for electoral contest, the elite
clans consolidated their power in order to give birth to
national  oligarchy instead of  a  national  government
(Anderson  1998).  With  this  newfound  power,  the
ruling elite are now in the position to thwart policies
that  favour  both  enemies  and  competitors.  This
system of politicking gave rise to what the Filipinos
call,  trapos  or  'dirty' traditional  politicians  [21‒23].
These  trapos  are  responsible  for  the  presence  of
'reverse accountability' in Philippine politics by holding
individual  voters  accountable  for  electing  their  re-
spective  patrons  to  power  in  exchange  for  favours
provided  in  the  past  or  those  promised  once  said
politician elected ([7] p. 55). The provision of favours,
however, does not always translate to actual votes. In
such  cases,  intimidation  and  aggression  are  often
employed by political players owning private armies to
ensure the delivery of paid votes [24]. The alternate
use of  benefits  and  violence for  preserving political
power  and  control  essentially  transforms  traditional
political aristocracy into some type of warlords [25].
In can be inferred, therefore, that the voters' support
for their  patrons is  largely a function of the latter's
'own interests,  rewards  for  loyalty,  and the  fear  of
vengeance' ([26] p. 260).
The nature of Philippine political-economy is referred
to  as  a  neo-patrimonial  system [10]. A  patrimonial
state  that  allows  oligarch  relations  and interests  to
dominate  bureaucratic  systems  creates  a  hunting
ground for the unrestricted accumulation of personal
wealth  [27].  Since  the  rent-seekers  emerging  from
this bureaucratic capitalist system are able to control
formal  state  structures  from  the  outside,  the  term
becomes  'neo-patrimonial' or  'booty capitalism' ([10]
pp. 18‒21).
The overwhelming oligarchic  influence has signif-
icantly  contributed  to  the  deterioration of  economic
development  in  the  Philippines  since  gaining  inde-
pendence from the United States in 1946 [28]. Even
the implementations  of  disastrous economic  policies
advanced by top government officials were eventually
manipulated  to  protect  the  interests  of  Filipino
oligarchs.  Philippine underdevelopment,  therefore,  is
not  just a matter of  constantly  choosing the wrong
policies, but rather the result of conscious efforts by
rent-seekers  to  maintain  them  for  the  continuous
exploitation of state mechanisms and resources.
A perfect illustration of  a  'wrong' policy selection
was  the  espousal  of  import  substitution  indus-
trialization  (ISI)  as  the  country's  primary  trade
strategy after  its  official  independence  from the US
[29‒30].  In  contrast  to  East  Asian  countries  that
launched an export-oriented strategy leading to annual
per capita GDP growth of 6%, the Philippines chose to
implement  ISI  and  became  the  worst  performing
economy in the Eastern half [31]. While the promotion
of ISI may indeed have been an honest mistake on
the part  of  Filipino technocrats,  the oligarchs' indif-
ference toward the correction of this mistake never-
theless underlined the unintended benefits it created
with  respect  to  the  their  interests.  Despite  the
exacerbated balance of trade and payments problems
created by ISI, this policy was maintained not for its
effectiveness in resolving the crisis but for its role in
opening a wider space for  'oligarch predation' ([7] p.
57).  This  confounding  relationship  between  local
oligarchs and the Philippine government is often re-
ferred to as 'rent capitalism' wherein rents are created
by the latter to provide the former with a synthetic
advantage by imposing restrictions on the free flow of
foreign goods and services into the market [32].
U.S. Governor-general William Howard Taft's 'policy
of  attraction'—originally  designed  to  entice  the
landlord class  into  collaboration  with the  Americans
rather  than  pursuing  revolutionary  struggles—trans-
formed the economic elite of the Spanish-colonial era
into a political-economic elite that continues to dom-
inate domestic politics today ([33] p. 142). And since
representative institutions had already emerged prior
to the development of a strong republic, patronage-
infested political parties had single-handedly squashed
government  reforms  that  threatened  to  curb  their
power. In the Philippine context, political parties are
'convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up,
merged with others, split, reconstituted, regurgitated,
resurrected,  renamed,  repackaged,  recycled,  refur-
bished, buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime'
([34] pp. 4‒5). This resulted to further marginalization
of  the  masses  who  were  unable  to  challenge  the
deeply-entrenched national oligarchy.
The palpable failure of American colonial regime to
renovate the foundations of domestic political power
vis-à-vis  the  imposition  of  its  own  brand  of  repre-
sentative  democracy  on  top  of  an  unjust  economic
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edifice, created an environment conducive to oligarch
predation by exploiting state institutions and manip-
ulating economic policy formulation [7]. The Philippine
government  has  continued  to  operate  within  this
context from one administration to another since the
country's formal independence. Therefore, implanting
a new constitutional framework that replicated a pre-
Martial  Law  system  within  a  relatively  unchanged
economic arrangement would be futile and counter-
intuitive to the prospect of change. In short, neither
regime  change  nor  democratization  helped  in  miti-
gating  the  oligarch's  influence  over  state  affairs,
particularly  in  decisions  involving  the  national  eco-
nomy.  As  a  consequence,  a  strongly  developed
Philippine republic is yet to emerge [7].
2.2.2. Limits to Human Security Act
The  post-1986  People  Power  Revolution  paved  the
way for rethinking national security as the security of
the people. The perceived divide between people and
state  is  artificial  as  they both  comprise  the nation-
state  [35].  Although  the  government  is  gradually
progressing toward the integration of human security
in its formulation of national security, the environment
within  which  such  policy  amendments  are  being
configured remains largely unstable and multifaceted.
Advancements made toward a humanist view of secu-
rity strategy are in danger  of  being undermined by
institutional mechanisms with inadequate capacity to
effectively  combat  contemporary  security  problems.
And  while  Filipino  policymakers  acknowledge  the
severity of  nontraditional  threats trespassing on the
country's supposedly sovereign boundaries, the term
human  security  is  still  nowhere  to  be  found  in  its
official NSP document. This implies that the normative
foundations  of  human  security  are  not  consistently
implanted  when  designing  a  definitive  NSP  agenda
despite  references  being  made  regarding  the  pro-
tection of grassroots civil societies [35].
A good example supporting this  argument is  the
passage of the Human Security Act of the Philippines
or the Republic Act No. 9372 in February 2007. This
Act defined human security as an  'act to secure the
state  and  our  people  from  terrorism' defined  as
'sowing  and  creating  conditions  of  widespread  and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in
order to coerce the government to give in to an un-
lawful  demand' [36]. In short,  the country's HSA is
both too narrow and too broad at the same time. On
the one hand,  it  frames human security  within  the
narrow  context  of  terrorism  which  contradicts  the
government's holistic approach to national security, as
well  as  the UNDP's  comprehensive  interpretation  of
human security [37]. On the other hand, it precludes
the fundamental aspects of a terrorist act in favour of
broad and vague expressions such as 'widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace' or
'unlawful demand' which also run in contrast to the
definition  proposed by the UN High Level  Panel  on
Threats, Challenges and Change [38].
While  the  official  discourse  of  HSA  highlights  its
importance  for  giving  the  government's  all-out  war
against  terror  legal  teeth  by  complementing  AFP's
strategic  operations,  however,  law  enforcement
agencies  seem to  be  uncomfortable  with  its  imple-
mentation  [39].  Such  contradiction  underlies  reser-
vations toward the Act,  given its  use  of  misleading
semantics.  Moreover,  human  rights  groups  have
strongly opposed the legislation of the HSA arguing
that it constitutes the building blocks of martial law.
The rights that are at risk of being violated include
freedom  of  expression,  association,  speech,  move-
ment, and due process, among others [40]. The ac-
countability of  the Anti-Terrorism Council  for  human
rights  violations  while  carrying  out  its  mandate  of
fighting against terrorism is not specifically addressed
in the said Act, blurring the line between Judiciary and
Executive roles [40].
Supporters of the anti-terrorism legislation, on the
other  hand,  point  to  Section  2  of  the  Act  which
highlights  the  safeguard  mechanisms  for  protecting
human  rights  by  upholding  basic  rights  and  funda-
mental liberties as enshrined in the Constitution. They
argue that  the HSA is  crucial  for  strengthening  the
country's democratic ideals  since  'unlike the secrecy
surrounding the pre-HSA extrajudicial killings, the new
law makes the prosecution of terrorists a transparent
matter  that  proceeds  under  the  supervision  of  the
Philippine judiciary' ([41] pp. 215‒216). Despite such
contextualization,  the  inefficiencies  of  the  country's
criminal  justice  system  have  not  been  properly
addressed [42]. Understandably, several international
organizations,  most  notably the International  Feder-
ation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, are
sceptical about the effectiveness of these safeguards,
given the government's bad record for policy imple-
mentation, and they argue that what the Philippines
really  needs  is  not  a  new  and  dangerously  broad
counterterrorism law,  but  better  efforts  to  make its
current justice system work [43].
This age-old dichotomy between the ineffectiveness
of  the  law  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  system  is
underlined  in  the  report  published  by  the  National
Council of Churches in the Philippines, which asked,
'How  can  the  State—which  stands  criticized  for
tolerating, if not authorizing the gross and systematic
violations of human rights—guarantee that, in imple-
menting the HSA, the people's civil and political rights
are not trampled upon' ([40] pp. 168‒169)? As such,
various  segments  of  civil  society  including  the  aca-
demia and NGOs share the view that  RA9372 is  in
violation of the Philippine Constitution by purporting
information designed to mislead the people [40].
Overall,  these two limits have significantly under-
mined  the  Philippine  government's  efforts  at
effectively  cohabiting  human  security  (defined  in
terms of economic security) into its national security
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framework. At the root of this insecurity is a deeply-
entrenched patronage system controlled by powerful
Filipino  oligarchy.  The  pervasiveness  of  this  politico-
economic arrangement has resulted to structural pov-
erty and institutionalized inequality that undermines the
Philippines' supposedly people-centred national security
model.  Neoliberal  economic  policies  intended  to  im-
prove development have been cunningly exploited by
oligarchic  forces  to  their  uncontested  advantage.  By
systematically  obstructing  social-equalizing  measures
that  curtail  oligarchic  wealth,  'national' prosperity  is
permanently  entrapped within the elite strata of  the
society.  The omnipresence of neo-patrimonial culture
in the Philippines reinforces a 'bipolar' society wherein
a few families enjoy the abundance of wealth at the
expense of the majority. Despite the Philippines' co-
habitative  national  security  framework  underlining
equitable  and  inclusive  economic  development,  the
limits to democratization vis-à-vis its Human Security
Act, have significantly undermined this end goal.
3.  Cohabiting  Human Security  into  Malaysia's
National Security Framework
3.1. Malaysia's 'Cohabitave' National Security
Malaysia's national security rhetoric and agenda are a
reflection of the government's struggle to transform a
former British colonial territory into one cohesive and
united  nation.  Accordingly,  Malaysia  adopts  a  fairly
comprehensive approach in defining national security
by weaving together its military, political,  economic,
social,  cultural,  and  psychological  components  [44].
Several  material  and  ideational  factors  influence
Malaysia's conception of  national  security,  including:
geography  and  history;  multi-ethnic  identity  and
religious plurality; an aspiration for national unity and
integration;  and a  dream of  becoming a  developed
country and a model Islamic nation [45‒46].
As such, Malaysia's national security encompasses
both  internal  and  external  dimensions.  On  the  one
hand, the domestic security being derived from internal
peace,  law,  and  order  is  crucial  to  the  fulfilment  of
basic needs and demands of its pluralistic society [45‒
46].  The presence of  internal  stability and harmony
underpin Malaysia's  pursuit  of  national  development
and progress. Hence, the passage and enactment of
legislation considered draconian in some liberal dem-
ocratic states is deemed necessary by the Malaysian
government in  order to control  its  ethnically-diverse
population  [46‒48].  On  the  other  hand,  external
security focuses on wide-ranging transnational threats
engendered by regional  and global  events including
terrorism, maritime piracy, drug cartels, illegal migrant
workers, and human trafficking, to name a few [49‒
51]. Malaysia's pursuit of national security, therefore,
implies  the  notion  of  strategic  survival,  both  inside
and outside its sovereign boundaries.
The conception of Malaysian national security has
been  largely  inspired  by  the  Emergency  period
between the years 1948 and 1960 [45,52‒55]. This
period saw the Malayan forces, backed by their British
colonizers,  fight  against  the  Malayan  National  Lib-
eration Army (MNLA),  a  group of  Communist  insur-
gents who claimed to be promoting a new democratic
socialist Malaya [45,46,52]. In response, the coalition
launched its  'hearts and minds' campaign to weaken
the social appeal of Communist propaganda and earn
the  loyalty  of  those  sympathetic  to  them  [45,48,
52,56‒57]. This proved to be an effective component
of the coalition's anti-Communist strategy as it led to
the establishment  of  a  new constitution singed be-
tween  the  United  Malays  National  Organization
(UMNO) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)
in 1957 [45‒46]. It is worth noting that both signa-
tories are member parties of the ruling BN coalition.
The  new  constitution  recognizes  the  legality  of
special  preferences  and  privileged  positions  being
provided to the Malays [45,48,52‒58]. Islam has been
formally elected as the state religion, while Malay was
made as the country's official language. Moreover, the
new constitution has granted a fixed quota of posts in
the civil  service to Malays in addition to their guar-
anteed  traditional  land  rights.  In  exchange  for
accepting  these  terms  under  the  Constitution,  the
Chinese  have  been  offered  extended  rights  of
citizenship [45‒46,59]. As stated in Article 153 of the
Malaysian Constitution:
It  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  Yang  di-
Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia)  to safeguard
the special position of the Malays and natives of
any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the
legitimate  interests  of  other  communities  in
accordance with the provisions of this Article [60].
Thus, the Constitution provides strong legal basis for
the  provision  of  exclusive  rights  and  privileges  to
Malays, locally known as the Bumiputras (literally, sons
of the soil) which are not extended to other ethnicities
thriving  in  Malaysia,  particularly  the  Chinese  and
Indian-Malaysians.  Notwithstanding  Malays'  continued
political supremacy and a considerably enhanced eco-
nomic  status,  Article  153 remains entrenched in  the
Constitution. The application of the Malaysian Consti-
tution legitimizes Malay interests even at the expense
of all other Malaysian ethnic groups.
The Emergency period served as a sine qua non for
legitimizing a national security framework that is both
operationally  despotic  and ideologically  centered  on
addressing  the  root  causes  of  threats.  Malaysia's
national security is essentially based on material and
ideational  constructs  designed  to  secure  its  ruling
dynastic coalition—the Barisan Nasional (BN)—rather
than the diversity space necessary for accommodating
the  political  and  economic  needs  of  its  multiethnic
population.  In fact,  the  BN defines  itself  as  a  con-
federation  of  political  parties  that  subscribe  to  the
objectives of the coalition, as opposed to the objec-
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tives of Malaysia's national interest [61]. 
Combining  ideological  constructs  with  a  coercive
apparatus  has  been  the  traditional  approach  to
developing  Malaysia's  national  security  rhetoric  and
agenda since the period of Emergency [46,52,54‒55,
62]. Such an approach is designed to secure the BN
by suppressing the growth of unorthodox ideas and
concepts,  while  justifying  the  supremacy  of  values
being cultivated by the ruling coalition. Together, coer-
cive and ideological instruments have played a crucial
role in Malaysia's national security, which made para-
mount the implicit protection of the Malay-dominated
coalition at the expense of its diversity space.
3.2.  Limits  to  Malaysia's  Diversity-based  National
Security 
In doing so, the UMNO-led BN coalition has vigilantly
upheld a paradoxical security framework propelled by
its  'hearts  and  minds'  slogan  exercised  through
coercive and repressive legislation [48, 62‒63]. Such a
paradox  presents  two  critical  limits  to  Malaysia's
diversity space that is pivotal to the country's cohab-
itative  national  security,  namely:  (i)  limits  to  ideo-
logical security apparatuses, and (ii) limits to material
security  apparatus.  The  interplay  between  these
factors substantially undermines the country's capacity
for  independently  formulating  and  executing  political
and economic policies vital to its national security. The
succeeding subsections discuss these limits which help
explain the country's continuously shrinking diversity
space, and therefore, its failure at fully embedding the
notion of human security (defined in terms of ethnic
security) within its national security framework.
3.2.1. Limits to the Ideological Security Apparatus
A  central  task  of  the  BN's  security  ideology  is  the
regulation  and  control  of  alternative  channels  for
discussing nonconforming opinions [48,62]. A variety
of  ideological  constructs  have  been put  in  place  to
legitimize the suppression of local political opponents
and critics,  thereby  protecting the prevailing  Malay-
dominated status quo. As Downs ([64] p. 96) argues,
these nonmaterial forces represent 'a verbal image of
the  good  society  and  of  the  chief  means  of  con-
structing such a society.' In other words, the govern-
ment  systematically  regulates  the  employment  of
ideologies to promote and preserve the security of the
BN  coalition,  pursued  under  the  pretext  of  safe-
guarding the constitutionality of specific Malay rights
and privileges that do not apply other ethnic groups.
The coalition's security ideologies serve a two-level
function:  first,  restricting  the  space  available  for
alternative ideas that question the BN; and second,
legitimizing  the  passage  and enactment  of  coercive
instruments vis-à-vis the coalition that exercises them
[48,63]. In doing so, they help in securing the pre-
eminent status of the coalition against threats coming
from various oppositional groups. The fluidity of ideas,
however,  implies  that  the  coalition's  security  ideo-
logies are neither permanent nor fixed but are con-
tingent on specific political and social contexts of the
time (48,  62].  Hence,  there  is  no  overarching  idea
that  dominates  Malaysia's  security  rhetoric.  Never-
theless, there is an underlying goal that binds these
security  ideologies  together,  that  is,  winning  the
hearts  and  minds  of  societal  actors  that  threaten
Malaysian  national  security  defined  in  terms  of  BN
security.
These coalition-enhancing ideational forces create a
'cloak  for  shabby  motives  and  appearances'  by
legitimizing and giving meaning to its conduct ([65] p.
314).  They  act  as  political  tools  for  securing  the
coalition's hegemony, rather than being mere reflec-
tions  of  the  country's  national  aspirations.  The
uncertainty and complexity of Malaysian politics in the
twenty-first  century  transforms  these  ideological
constructs  into  electoral  'chips'  necessary  for  con-
tinued survival of the coalition [48,53,62‒63,66‒68].
Accordingly, the ideational components underpinning
Malaysia's  national  security  framework  are  naturally
bent  to  quash  counter-narratives,  thereby  further
shrinking the country's diversity space. 
Islam plays a pivotal role in the hearts and minds
campaign  of  the  coalition.  As  a  Muslim-dominated
federal  constitutional  monarchy,  Malaysia's  national
security  becomes  a  function  of  its  state-configured
Islamic ideology [48,63,69‒71]. Its goal is to cement
the country's role as a worthy leader of the Muslim
world  by  projecting  an  image  of  moderation  and
tolerance [48,62‒63]. Islam must be the people's way
of life and the coalition's brand of leadership. It is the
very  'visible  hand'  that  runs and controls Malaysia's
internal  and  external  affairs,  and dictates  what  the
objectives  of  national  security  will  be.  Crafting  the
country's national security rhetoric and agenda based
on  the  underlying  goal  of  securing  the  coalition
becomes  the  paramount  concern  of  the  ruling  BN
political  elites,  particularly  for  those  comprising  the
United  Malays  National  Organisation  (UMNO)  party
[48,62‒63].
On  the  one  hand,  Mahathir's  security  ideology
represents  a  two-faced  Malaysian  national  security
framework by endorsing a non-violent and non-forcible
Islamic  rhetoric  at  the  international  scene,  while
encouraging coercive and aggressive policies in imple-
menting these teachings at the domestic sphere on the
other [48,59,63]. Such an approach to national security
effectively  aids  in the legitimization of the coalition's
domestic  security  machinery  which  means  the
perpetuation of the Malay-dominated BN coalition, and
therefore, the diminution of Malaysia's diversity space.
At the international level, the Mahathir regime has
portrayed Malaysia as the 'model Islamic state' of the
post-9/11  world  [48,51,55,62‒63].  The  former  PM
argued that  its  government  had  been successful  in
fighting terrorism domestically  by  adding ideological
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'sweeteners' to its coercive policies [51,55,62]. Such a
claim is  typically made in the context of the Emer-
gency,  where  the  defeat  of  communism  is  largely
viewed as a result of its hearts and minds ideology,
emphasizing  a  moderate  and  tolerant  Islam  [45‒
46,52,54,62].
At  the  domestic  level,  however,  the  opposite  is
observed. Mahathir's state-sponsored Islam has been
propagated  with  the  help  of  strong  coercive
legislation, particularly the Internal Security Act (ISA)
of  1960  and  its  replacement,  the Security  Offences
Special  Measures  Act  (SOSMA)  of  2012  [48,54,56,
59,63,72].  This  highlights  underlying  contradictions
within  Mahathir's  ideational  panorama—conquering
the hearts and minds of a fearful population through
the forced imposition of a coalition-made Islam. The
implicit goal of eliminating counter-narratives to BN's
vision of Malaysian nation-building has been pursued
under the banner of counterterrorism (48, 63).
On  the  other  hand,  Badawi's  security  doctrine
which  he  called  Islam Hadhari  (Civilizational  Islam)
still reflects Mahathir's aim at securing the coalition,
rather than the diversity of its multi-ethnic population
[48,63,73‒74]. Substance-wise, Islam Hadhari has no
significant  difference  from  Mahathir's  Asian  values
[75]. In terms of form, however, Abdullah's ideology
takes Mahathir's notion of the 'model Islamic state' to
a higher level,  by developing a comprehensive doc-
trine  embracing  Muslim  and  non-Muslim  audiences
alike,  both  at  home  and  abroad  [48,63].  In  other
words,  Malaysia's  signature  Islam  has  been  trans-
formed into an exportable commodity that reinforces
the  legitimacy  of  the  BN  coalition  beyond  the
country's borders [48,73].
The terms that have been used to develop Islam
Hadhari  were  fairly  'universal',  and as  such can  be
applied  to  different  contexts.  Badawi's  ideology
represents a shift toward understanding the contem-
porary era within the purview of Islam [73]. It is the
form, rather than substance that made Islam Hadhari
an appealing ideological construct [48,63]. By utilizing
charismatic  Islamic  terminology,  Badawi  has  suc-
ceeded in reigniting the coalition's unpopular security
ideology  (Liow  2005).  Badawi's  main  thrust  is  to
recalibrate Islam as a progressive religion that values
individual  and  communal  development  [76].  For
instance,  the fourth,  fifth, and sixth principles high-
light  Islam  Hadhari's  economic  undertones  which
reflect Badawi's promotion of Islam as a religion for
development  [48,51,63,57,77‒78].  By  restoring  the
sense  of  moderation  toward  the  practice  of  Islam,
Badawi had hoped that non-Muslim Malaysians would
feel embraced by the regime [69].
At  the  international  level,  Badawi  attempted  to
export Islam Hadhari to both Muslim and non-Muslim
countries. The idea is to cement Malaysia's role as a
model  nation  and  leader  of  the  Muslim  world  by
manufacturing it as a development model based on a
state-authorized version of Islam [48,63]. However, at
the domestic level, the operationalization of Badawi's
doctrines  is  questionable  at  best.  It  is  not  clear
whether  Islam  Hadhari  represents  genuine  efforts
toward  a  progressive  interpretation  of  Islamic
thinking, or merely a strategy for securing Malaysian
votes by not openly marginalizing its non-Malay and
non-Muslim population [69,76].
The coalition has utilized its ideological machinery
in justifying the coercive measures undertaken during
a series of crackdowns against 'deviant' sects such as
the  Tarikat  Samaniah  Ibrahim  Bonjol  in  2004,  and
Terengganu  or  Sky  Kingdom  in  2005  [79‒81].  In
2004,  seventy  members  of  the  Muslim  sect  Tarikat
Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol  were arrested in  Selangor
by Islamic religious authorities [79‒81]. The govern-
ment claimed that the sect treated the Qur'an as a
historical  text,  which resulted to its  'casual'  attitude
toward  prayer  and  marriage.  In  the  aftermath  of
these  arrests,  Malaysian  chief  executive,  Khir  Toyo
announced his plan to vanquish some sixty divergent
sects operating in Selangor [79‒81]. In 2005, another
religious sect in Terengganu known as Sky Kingdom
was  also  shut  down by  the  Department  of  Islamic
Development [79]. The government claimed that the
movement  was  propagating  documents  that  coun-
tered  Islamic  teachings.  Its  leader,  Ayah  Pin  was
presented to the public as threat to national security
by espousing alternative views on religion and lifestyle
that differ from those provided by the government. In
doing  so,  Aya  Pin  was  not  only  jeopardizing  the
country's  official  religion  but  also  destabilizing  the
political status quo [80].
The  government  has  portrayed  these  religious
entities as threats to Malaysia's national  security by
espousing alternative views of Islam, and adopting a
lifestyle different from the ones endorsed by the BN
coalition. However, Sky Kingdom's 'threats' to national
security  were  ideational  rather  than  material  in
nature. These events offer a glimpse to the condition
of diversity space in Malaysia despite its multiethnic,
multireligious  society.  These  events  highlight  Ma-
laysia's unsecured diversity space amid a multiethnic,
multireligious society, which in turn, undermines the
country's national security.
Islam Hadhari has also provided the government an
effective ideological apparatus for stifling its political
rival,  the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Badawi
has likened PAS' brand of Islam to a trap that must be
exposed  to  prevent  Malay  Muslims  from  being
ensnared [48,74].  Under  Islam Hadhari,  the  PAS is
faced with a lose-lose situation: either to comply with
a BN-sponsored Islam and operate within this limited
context or reject this model and become an enemy of
the  state  [48,55,63,76].  Either  way,  the  ideological
terrain within which PAS can manoeuvre is significantly
diminished. Needless to say, Islam Hadhari has further
enhanced the government's monopolistic control over
the  organization  and  facilitation  of  Islam.  Divergent
sects operating beyond the provisions and boundaries
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set  by  the  coalition  are  more  easily  detected  and
trounced. Hence, Islam Hadhari becomes an extension
of the implicit campaign against the expansion of the
diversity space critical for Malaysia's pluralistic society.
3.2.2. Limits to the Material Security Apparatus
The  government's  ideational  security  constructs  are
complemented by a material security apparatus. This
involves  are  coercive  laws  designed  to  secure  the
status-quo by removing all material and/or ideational
challenges  to  its  legitimacy  [45‒46,48,53‒55,58‒
59,63,67,82].  A primary example is  the recently  re-
pealed Internal Security Act (ISA) passed by PM Abdul
Rahman in 1960 [83]. The ISA served as a preventive
detention law which enabled the arrests of individuals
without  trial  and  criminal  charges  under  limited,
legally defined circumstances for sixty days. Moreover,
the Act also allowed the extension of  this  detention
period for up to two years upon the discretion of the
Home Minister with minimal  judicial review [83]. As
stated in Section 73 of the Act, 'any police officer may
arrest and detain without warrant any person who has
acted  or  is  about  to  act  or  is  likely  to  act  in  any
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any
part thereof' [83].
The ISA is further complemented by the Sedition
Act,  revised  in  1971  by  Malaysia's  second  PM  Tun
Abdul Razak which made any questioning of Malayan
paramountcy  an  act  of  treason.  The  Act  prohibits
virtually all activities with 'seditious tendency', resulting
to disaffection and hostility toward the government or
communal ill will [84]. Despite initial controversies, the
coalition has skilfully justified the presence of ISA and
Sedition  Act  as  necessary  legislation  for  ensuring
Malaysia's national security  [45‒46,52].Such laws are
deemed to be particularly relevant in the context of the
post-9/11 world order, where they serve as effective
counterterrorism measures akin to the Patriot Act of
the US, and the Anti-Terrorism Act of the UK.
In recent years, however, opposition to the ISA has
grown considerably. Critics have argued that the Act
was passed to stifle what should have been legitimate
political  oppositions  under  a  well-functioning  dem-
ocratic  society  and  as  such  had  been compared  to
internal pre-emptive strike, given its preventive nature
[53‒54]. For example, during the 1987 Operasi Lalang
(Weeding  Operation),  106  people  were  arrested
without  proper  charges under the ISA.  Most of  the
detainees were members of the opposition party and
various social activist  groups. The coalition issued a
White  Paper explaining  the  arrests,  stating  that
various groups which had played up sensitive issues
and  thus  created  racial  tension  in  the  country  had
exploited  the  government's  liberal  and  tolerant
attitude [54‒55,85‒86].
One  of  the  most  significant  outcomes  of  this
struggle was the introduction of section 8B of the ISA
which  blocked  judicial  review  of  ISA  detentions
including  those  brought  as  habeas  corpus  petitions
[87‒88]. In 2001, this section of the ISA was used to
detain  members  of  the  People's  Justice  Party  (PJP)
dubbed as the  'Reformasi or KeADILan 10' [87‒88].
The  detainees,  led  by  Anwar  Ibrahim's  wife,  Wan
Azizah Ismail pressed vocally for his release, Ibrahim
had been convicted of misuse of power and sodomy in
trials, which according to Human Rights Watch, were
marred by coerced confessions of key witnesses [87‒
88].  Prior  to  his  imprisonment,  Anwar  was  leading
rallies  across  Malaysia  in  support  of  his  newly-
formed reformasi movement, preaching to vast crowds
in favour of far-reaching social, political, and economic
reforms  [45,54‒55,86].  In  response,  Mahathir's  side
claimed  that  the  arrested  activists  were  planning
violent protests to overthrow the government and were
attempting  to  procure  dangerous  weapons  and
explosives [87‒88]. Yet despite the serious nature of
these charges, the government failed to produce any
credible evidence to support its claim.
These abuses  drove  oppositionist  groups,  human
rights  activists,  and  other  civil  society  advocates  to
mobilize  large-scale  protests  against  the  ISA,  por-
trayed  as  unnecessary draconian law that  does not
bode well for Malaysia's vision of progressing toward
'developed nation'  status  [87‒88].  The popularity of
these  movements,  along  with  the  resurgence  of  a
stronger opposition after the 2008 General  Election,
played a crucial role in PM Najib's decision to repeal
the  Act.  In  2012,  the Security  Offences  (Special
Measures)  Act  or  SOSMA has  officially  replaced  the
ISA [89]. The new Act is  envisioned  'to provide for
special measures relating to security offences for the
purpose of maintaining public order and security and
for connected matters.'
In contrast to ISA, the new law requires the filing
of  charges  based  on  credible  evidence  against
detainees  after  twenty-eight  days  [89].  Thus,  the
burden to  produce  reliable  proof  within  a  specified
time  frame  is  shifted  to  the  government's  law  en-
forcement  and  intelligence  agencies  responsible  for
combating terrorist activities. However, SOSMA is also
being  criticized  from both  sides.  On  the  one hand,
anti-terrorist  groups  argue  that  the  requirement  to
bring charges within twenty-eight days under SOSMA
weakens Malaysia's capacity to pre-emptively contain
terrorist  threats  [90].  On  the  other,  human  rights
groups criticise SOSMA for allowing police to authorise
communication intercepts and permitting prosecutors
to  present  evidence  without  disclosing  sources.
Moreover, acquitted suspects in the midst of an appeal
may  still  be  detained  in  prison  or  tethered  to  a
monitoring device until the appeal is formally settled
[90].
Overall,  these two limits have significantly under-
mined  the  Malaysian  government's  efforts  to  effec-
tively  cohabit  human  security  (defined  in  terms  of
ethnic security)  into its national  security framework.
The BN's ideational and material security apparatuses
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ensure the preservation of a Malay-dominated status
quo. In the process, the BN has become synonymous
with the Malaysian nation-state. The noble objective
of protecting Malays' interests is equated to the venal
objective of preserving the BN's political supremacy,
pursued  under  the  banner  of  securing  Malaysia's
shrinking diversity space. In pursuing its Bumiputra-
oriented  social  vision,  the  government  has  utilized
trade  liberalization,  along  with  complementary  neo-
liberal  economic  policies,  but  often  at  the  expense
other Malaysian ethnic communities. In other words,
they  have  been  fervently  pursued  to  reinforce  and
safeguard a Malay-imagined society.  As long as  the
constitutional frameworks that legitimize a Bumiputra-
centric  Malaysian  nation-state  are  sustained,  de-
ethnicizing the country's politico-economic and socio-
cultural  arrangements  remains  highly  implausible.
Thus,  Malaysia's  national  security  is,  for  better  or
worse, developed around Malay ethnic identity.
4. Conclusion
This article has critically examined the Philippines and
Malaysia's  experiences  with  cohabiting  the  human
security concept into their respective national security
frameworks. It argued that while on the one hand, the
Philippines'  primary  security  referent  object  is  its
shrinking development space amid a deeply-entrenched
patronage  system  controlled  by  a  powerful  Filipino
oligarchy;  on  the  other,  Malaysia's  main  security
referent object is its contracting diversity space amid a
Bumiputra-centric  political  economy,  developed  and
controlled by the perpetually ruling BN coalition. Both
the Philippines and Malaysia's primary security referent
objects—development  space  and  diversity  space—
represent the non-traditional, people-centred dimension
of  national  security  rather  than  its  traditional,  state-
centric dimension.
A variety of  limits  have severely  undermined  the
two  countries'  efforts  at  cohabiting  human  security
into their respective national security frameworks. In
the case of the Philippines, the limits of its democ-
ratization and its Human Security Acts have produced
an enormous challenge to securing its  development
space, defined in terms of economic security. Whereas
in the case of Malaysia, the limits to ideological and
material security apparatus have presented significant
constraints in securing its diversity space, defined in
terms of ethnic security.
These  limits  have  contributed  to  the  country's
lacklustre  experience  with  cohabitative  security.
Nevertheless,  both cases have illustrated a concrete
way of giving entitlement to non-traditional, people-
centered elements  of  security as legitimate  referent
objects  of  a  national  security  framework.  The
Philippine  and  Malaysian  experiences  underscores  a
two-pronged  assumption:  first,  the  meaning  and
provision of national security can neither be eloquently
articulated nor completely substantiated without con-
sideration of  'below the state' actors and issues; and
second, the eminent status of the state vis-à-vis power
in providing national security can neither be trivialized
nor undermined. 
Hence,  instead  of  downplaying  a  state-centric
concept  while  highlighting  a  people-centred  model,
cohabitative  security  amalgamates  statist  and  hu-
manist views of national security. This is one approach
to resolving the 'entitled state versus untitled human'
dilemma in which the state is ordinarily depicted as an
antagonistic  force  obstructing  the  quest  for  human
security.
This  invisible  yet  concrete  divide  between  states
and individuals vis-à-vis communities, creates a dist-
orted view that the state does not acknowledge the
multidimensionality of national security in the modern-
day era.  Thus,  despite  claims being made by  state
actors  with regard  to their  revised national  security
rhetoric  and  agenda,  non-state  actors  continue  to
view national  security  as  a  purely  militaristic  object
bereft  of  human  sensibility.  On  the  one  hand,  the
state claims to have created a novel national security
vision  protecting  human  security.  But  on  the  other
hand,  citizens  and  communities  equate  national
security  to  the  anachronistic  pursuit  of  sovereignty
and territorial boundaries.
The  employment  of  cohabitative  security  means
that  state  security  and  human  security  become
mutually  constitutive  and  reinforce  dimensions  of
national  security.  A  shift  in  the  government's  per-
ception  of  state  security  can  have  a  corresponding
impact  on  individuals  and  communities'  collective
perception of human security, and vice versa. There-
fore, this allows the state to have a more positive and
nurturing  image  in  the  security  narrative.  It  veers
away from the innate tendency to portray the state as
a  completely  distinct  security  domain  that  must  be
temporarily  de-emphasized  and/or  unaccounted  for
when advancing human security objectives.
In doing so, it  'unvilifies'  the role of the state in
pursuing  a  human  security  rhetoric  and  agenda.
Instead  of  being  diametrically  opposed,  the  cohab-
itative  security  approach  shows  that  state  security
complements human security, and vice versa. To some
extent, the invisible divide between the 'high politics'
of the states and the  'low politics' of the people and
communities  is  bridged,  enabling  state  actors  to
realize the multidimensionality of national security in
the  twenty-first  century.  A  more  collective  under-
standing of national security shared by governments
and citizens is therefore realized.
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